TRANSATLANTIC TENSION AND THREAT PERCEPTION

Mary Elise Sarotte

uropeans, now dealing with a second Bush tour of duty, are understandably wondering whether it will reverse the deterioration in transatlantic relations begun during the first. That the state of relations declined during the first term is not in doubt. Despite the initial outpouring of sympathy for the United States in late 2001 and early 2002, in 2003 a poll by the German Marshall Fund (GMF) found that an astonishing 81 percent of German and 82 percent of French respondents had come to disapprove of the way that President Bush was handling international policy. In February and March 2004, the Pew Research Center repeated similar poll questions not only in Europe but also worldwide. When asked if they thought that American and British leaders had honestly believed that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq or had simply lied, 82 per-

Dr. Mary Sarotte, a U.S. citizen, is a tenured faculty member in the Department of Politics at the University of Cambridge and a Fellow of St. John's College. Dr. Sarotte received her bachelor's degree from Harvard and earned a PhD in history at Yale. She has written for The Economist, Time, Die Zeit, worked for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and served as a White House Fellow. She appears as a political commentator on CNN International and Sky. Her publications include Dealing with the Devil (2001) and German Military Reform and European Security (2001), as well as popular and scholarly articles.

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cent of French respondents said the leaders had been lying. The French percentage was higher even than that of Morocco (48 percent), Pakistan (61 percent), Turkey, and Jordan (both 69 percent).² These statistics are only a tiny sample; there are many more to this effect.³

The reasons underlying this unfortunate decline are numerous and have rightly received extensive attention. This essay will not repeat well-known arguments—most famously, Robert Kagan's view that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus—but rather offer a new hypothesis. It will suggest how political history—and particularly the legacy of eighteenth-century politics—can help us to understand the current rift.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

What governments perceive as a threat is determined by what they understand their areas of responsibility, and their priorities, to be. So, to understand threat perception, it is necessary to step back and look at the evolution of federal authority. In other words, it is necessary to ask a very basic question: What are the responsibilities of the central authority? Even a brief historical examination, such as that provided below, shows that Americans and Europeans have very different notions of federal authority, and that this, in turn, shapes their very differing threat perceptions. An understanding of this discrepancy will help prevent both sides from talking past each other during the second Bush administration.

METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS

A few clarifications are necessary before getting under way. First, this article will employ the methodology of political history. It will focus on American and European perceptions of how a national authority can best respond to global threats and on the impact of the disparity between their views. It will not attempt, in the limited space available, to show that Americans are right and Europeans are wrong, or vice versa. Rather, the goal of this article is to highlight the discrepancies, which have themselves received insufficient attention. Secondly, threat perception for present purposes means the public understanding of threat, as displayed in polling data, speeches, and public proclamations.⁴

Finally, it is important to define "U.S. power" as used here. The focus will be on American military power, because the transatlantic rift is, in large part, a debate about how that should be used in the world (if at all). As a result, before debating how to use U.S. might, it is helpful to make at least a brief attempt to quantify just how much of it there is. Depending on which figures are included, U.S. defense spending tops that of the next twelve to fifteen nations combined and represents between 40 and 50 percent of all world spending on defense. The United States maintains 752 military installations in 130 countries, with significant numbers of troops in sixty-five of these. As Princeton's Professor John Ikenberry puts it, "U.S. military bases and carrier groups ring the world. Russia is in a quasi-formal security partnership with the United States, and China has accommodated itself to U.S. dominance, at least for the moment. For the first time in the modern era, the world's most powerful state can operate on the global stage without the constraints of other great powers."

Of course, there are many different kinds and levels of power exertion, as anyone with even a passing familiarity with Joseph Nye's multilevel chessboard knows. In their book *America's Inadvertent Empire*, retired general William Odom and coauthor Robert Dujarric inventively measure American power not only by its defense budget but also by the youth of its population and even by the

number of articles published in a year by the Harvard economics faculty (more than that of any continental European country). Yale professor Paul Kennedy also looks to less obvious indicators. He cites the fact that scholars working in the United States have won 75 percent of Nobel Prizes in science, medicine, and economics as evidence of American dominance. Indeed, in May 2004, Science ranked universities around the world on the basis of easily tabulated indicators, such as numbers of articles cited and prizes won. Of the top fifty universities worldwide, thirty-five were American. 10

None of this makes the United States invulnerable, of course. Its indebtedness and current-account deficit render it financially vulnerable. As the world's strongest military power, it is also the world's most tempting target. It also has to contend with the classic security dilemma—it must perpetually worry about whether its predominance might provoke a balancing reaction and, if so, when and in what form. Nonetheless, there is a quantitative strength that informs Bush administration thinking about its obligations (or lack thereof) to the world.

USING POLITICAL HISTORY TO HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF "FEDERALISM"

How can political history help us understand the current transatlantic rift? It illuminates the fundamental transatlantic divide as to what kind of security the central government should provide. Americans and Europeans have very different views of the role of the federal government in providing for their national security. It is even hard to know what language to use to describe this gap; the American notion of "federal authority" barely translates into the European context. In continental Europe, "federal" is a word associated largely with the European Union (EU) and connotes dispersal of authority. In the United States, the "federal government" (or even the "feds") is a shorthand reference to the national government and centralized power—a twist effected centuries ago by James Madison to co-opt opponents of a strong central government, as will be discussed below. So, American citizens can talk of federal power, but the phrase is often lost in translation, since its meaning is different in the European context.

When this discrepancy in the understanding of "federalism" overlaps with transatlantic debates about how best to ensure security, it becomes apparent that a curious collision of historical legacies is happening. The three main legacies are a narrow U.S. interpretation of the role of the federal government, which originated in the eighteenth-century debate over how much central authority was permissible; the Cold War expansion of federal power in light of the need for an extensive American national security apparatus; and a very different European notion of the responsibilities of a central authority.

A Narrow U.S. View of the Federal Government's Security Role

To understand the present American view of the federal government's security role, it helps to investigate its origins in one of the most revered collections of documents in the nation's political history, the Federalist Papers. Authored by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, these eighty-five essays were published in the New York Independent Journal newspaper in 1787 and 1788. They represented an eloquent effort to sway doubting members of the public in favor of ratifying the draft U.S. Constitution and of creating a strong national government. Given how revered the Constitution is today, it is important to remember how controversial it was originally. Citizens of the United States at the time had the evils of overly powerful central authority fresh in their memories. They had recently fought a war to rid themselves of the rule of the British monarch. However, the weak central authority erected after the war under the Articles of Confederation had proved unequal to the task of governing the fragile new country. The draft produced at the Constitutional Convention in the summer of 1787 was a daring attempt to redefine national government. The authors of these papers were hoping to steal their opponents' thunder by calling themselves "federalists" and the strong central government they proposed a federal one. 11

Jay, future chief justice of the Supreme Court, argued in *Federalist 3* that "among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their *safety* seems to be the first." He pessimistically continued in *Federalist 4*, "It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it." As a result, a crucial justification for creating a strong national authority was defense. "Leave America divided into thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent governments—what armies could they raise and pay—what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense?"

In other words, the very first justification for political union offered by three of America's greatest political minds was what U.S. leaders would today call homeland security. This view, rather than fading in the following centuries of American growth and expansion, has remained a significant strain of contemporary conservative political thought. It holds that protecting U.S. territorial integrity is not just the first but the *only* truly vital mission of the U.S. federal government. It is a view prevalent in much of America to this day, and not just in the post-9/11 "red states." In 1996 and again in 2000, RAND, the Kennedy School, and the Nixon Center jointly organized a Commission on U.S. National Interests. The commission could find only four: territorial integrity, security of all of North America, prevention of domination of Europe and Northeast Asia

by a hostile power, and maintenance of key international trading and financial networks. Of these, the first was the only truly vital one.¹³

In contrast, today's Europeans—even the British—expect much more from their national leaders than territorial defense: free (or low-cost) health care and university-level education, national news broadcasting, and public transportation, to name just a few. In other words, the narrow view of federal authority exemplified by the right wing of the Republican Party is badly at odds with the view even of those Europeans right of center, to say nothing of the left.

The Cold War Legacy

This narrow American understanding of federal authority, strategic weakness in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and the strains of continental expansion and civil war meant that the resulting U.S. foreign policy was an inward-looking one. Indeed, at first glance it might seem that the only logical foreign policy that could arise from such a narrow view would be isolationism. Conflict with Mexico notwithstanding, it took the events of the twentieth century to prove otherwise—that such a narrow understanding of federal responsibility can, and does, translate into interventionism. In other words, there has always been agreement across the U.S. political spectrum on the need to defend the homeland. The eternal question is how. As memorably phrased by political scientist Michael Roskin, the conundrum is whether that defense starts "on the near or far side of the ocean."

Woodrow Wilson was the first president to make a sustained effort to defend U.S. security on the far side of the ocean. Whether he did so out of idealism (as say his supporters) or imperialism (as say his detractors), the relevant point for our purposes is that he was clearly unafraid of action overseas. As the British political scientist Michael Cox and others have argued, "he was never squeamish when it came to using American force abroad: he did so in fact on no fewer than seven occasions between 1914 and 1918." After the end of World War I, however, he lost the political backing needed to continue engagement abroad in peacetime. He could take the United States into World War I, but he could not establish interventionism as a legacy, or so it seemed. The matter appeared firmly settled in favor of isolationism.

The catastrophe of the Weimar era not only reopened the matter sooner than anyone expected but decisively created a new legacy of American engagement abroad. In his *Surprise, Security and the American Experience*, Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis praises President Franklin Delano Roosevelt for realizing this sooner and more clearly than anyone else. He argues that FDR's true genius lay in his ability to embed "conflicting unilateral priorities within a cooperative multilateral framework." In other words, Roosevelt realized that the "pursuit of

national interests . . . need not preclude the emergence of collective interests, because nobody had an interest in fighting another great war." His cooperative approach—that is, starting U.S. defense on the far side of the ocean in cooperation with the people who lived there—proved to be one of the most successful grand strategies of all time.

This switch to defending the United States "on the far side of the ocean," which defined the Cold War, had far-reaching consequences not only for foreign policy but also for U.S. domestic politics. The creation of a permanent massive national security apparatus greatly increased the power of the federal government in Washington, D.C. As Ikenberry and his coauthor Daniel Deudney argue, it also served to strengthen American national identity by overcoming "ethnic and sectional differences and the ideological heritage of individualism." Writing in 1994, they predicted that the sudden end of the Cold War would cause these accomplishments to unravel. In other words, the pendulum would swing back to calling for defense on the *near* side of the ocean, with a corresponding decrease in interest in international issues. ¹⁹ Various statistics from the 1990s support their observation. American spending on coverage of foreign news declined. Foreign language courses emptied of students. ²⁰ Even PhD candiates in political science did not have to learn the language or culture of the countries in which they were supposedly becoming expert. ²¹

Crucially, 11 September 2001 stopped the pendulum. This in turn created a paradox. In responding to the terrorist attacks of that day, the Bush administration launched upon a mission that is, although not in detail, fundamentally Cold War in spirit. Namely, it is starting the defense of the homeland on the far (sometimes very far) side of the ocean. As a result, two legacies have collided. The administration is using U.S. might to undertake a mission consistent with the Cold War, or interventionist, legacy, even as it subscribes to the earlier legacy of limited federal responsibility. Its narrow view of the role of the central government is, for example, the rationale that inspires the Bush administration's fervent tax-cutting philosophy. The inherent conflict between the two legacies is crucial.

The world is no longer in the post–Cold War, or even post-post–Cold War, period but rather what might properly be called the Washington Era, for it is Washington's convictions and contradictions that define it. This contradiction is central to the administration's foreign policy, so it is worth detailing the policy consequences. The poor fit between these two legacies manifests itself in profound policy-making ambivalence. The chief result is the paradoxical (and counterproductive) combination of wars of prevention overseas with a decrease in both taxation and federal programs at home. It produces, first, equally fervent desires to send troops abroad and to bring them home, both quickly; second, willingness to call for cooperative security but to defeat or to abandon

agreements in the Senate or on the campaign trail; and third, insistence that others comply with international accords even as the United States exempts itself.²² Of course, there are deeper contradictions as well. As historian Mel Leffler rightly points out, "If one's credibility is vested in the achievement of too many goals, one's relative power will erode and one's core values may become imperiled."²³

Moreover, on a practical level, the administration is fighting a new kind of asymmetric war against transnational, nonstate actors while burdened with not just Cold War concepts but the very same national security institutions. If the mission is Cold War in spirit, many U.S. national security institutions are also Cold War in practice. As the 9/11 Commission's concluding report of July 2004 maintained, the federal government still has much outdated national security bureaucracy and needs updating as soon as possible.²⁴ It remains to be seen whether the intelligence reform bill passed in December 2004 will institute significant changes in the security practices.

American versus European Threat Perceptions

What does this clash of legacies imply for threat perception? To the president and chief executive officer of RAND, James Thomson, it is apparent that the breakdown in American-European relations has its fundamental roots "in the different strategic appraisals of . . . Germany, France and several smaller European countries." Just as Europeans have different expectations from their national governments, they also have different assessments of what constitutes a threat to their well-being—in other words, requires a response. What does this mean in practice?

Post-9/11, the United States senses a new vulnerability and a new kind of existential threat. Its defense budget has risen, topping four hundred billion dollars in fiscal year 2005. September 11 has even enabled the Bush administration to explore ways to reexamine the utility of nuclear weapons, in particular so-called mini-nukes. As deterrence scholar Patrick Morgan puts it, "Inside its military establishment, in Congress, industry and the public there are clusters devoted to finding better living through nuclear weapons. . . . All are hoping to make nuclear weapons steadily more usable."

In contrast, for many European political leaders, particularly the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and Germany, terrorism is an old problem. European states, and the EU as a whole, did indeed tighten their domestic security measures in response to both the 2001 and the Madrid attacks. But a high-profile Council on Foreign Relations task force headed by Henry Kissinger and Lawrence Summers pointed out in 2004 that many NATO allies had begun "questioning the administration's insistence that the security of all nations was now at risk." As Robert Kagan put it, in a 2004 updating of his famous 2002 article,

Most Europeans never fully shared Washington's concerns about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea—not during the Clinton administration, and not since. . . . Rightly or wrongly, Europeans do not believe that those weapons will be aimed at them. To the extent that they do worry, moreover, most Europeans do not look to the United States to protect them anymore. . . . Instead, they ask, Who will guard the guards?²⁸

Even as American politicians sound the alarm, Europeans sound skeptical. U.S. Department of Homeland Security "orange alerts" provoke shrugs on the continent. To cite just one example, when Tom Ridge made American headlines on 6 August 2004 with his elevated-threat warning to financial districts in the New York and Washington, D.C., areas, EU officials yawned. The union's counterterrorism director, Gijs de Vries, remained on vacation. The director of Germany's Institute for Terrorism Research and Security Policy, Rolf Tophoven, questioned the timing and echoed former U.S. presidential candidate Howard Dean in his assessment of the August alert: "You shouldn't forget that there is an election campaign and that in times of crisis people tend to rally around the incumbent government. This is not a bad thing for Bush." As Richard Betts has pointed out, the failings of the American intelligence community in the run-up to the Iraq war, and subsequent investigations into what went wrong, have created enormous skepticism about U.S. worries.

European political leaders are, of course, worried by Islamic extremism. But their threat assessment encompasses a greater variety of concerns. Although almost never voiced publicly by elected European officials, there is concern about Russia. It is rarely announced as policy, but the force structure of the Bundeswehr—still, all these years after the end of the Cold War, organized to defend the homeland against tanks coming from the east—makes it obvious. In a way that frustrates and confounds its NATO partners, Germany still de facto prioritizes conventional territorial defense even as it pledges allegiance to the Petersberg tasks,* which presume force projection capabilities.³¹

The Russians returned the favor. In a speech in London on 13 July 2004, Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov spoke bluntly of his country's feelings about NATO expansion to the Baltics:

You are all aware of our calmly negative attitude towards expansion of the North Atlantic alliance. . . . What alarms us the most, from the point of view of our own security is the NATO deployment of means and forces on the territory of its new members. . . . Our anxiety over the state of arms control in Europe is based on the fact that the "gray zone" in this sphere has evolved in Europe for the first time in the

^{*}Steps designed to improve the operational capability of the Western European Union (WEU), as contained in the Petersberg Declaration, issued by a WEU Council of Ministers meeting in Bonn, 19 June 1992.

last fifteen years. We wouldn't like Europe to return to the principles of balance of power, but there may be no vacuum in the military-political situation. Especially if this vacuum is filled with irresponsible statements of nationalistic character. Frankly speaking, the existence of European states that do not observe standard norms of democracy and human rights is interpreted by Russia as a threat.³²

With a few changes of names and dates, much of this language would still represent serviceable Cold War boilerplate. However alarming it might sound to Europeans, however, it rated barely a mention in the United States. The Bush administration, despite the Yukos Oil Company drama at the end of 2004* and an internal review begun early in 2005, largely considers Russia to be a solved problem—and it is undertaking significant force restructuring in Europe. On 16 August 2004, President Bush announced to a convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars that the Pentagon would withdraw sixty to seventy thousand troops from Europe and Asia—mainly two heavy divisions now based in Germany—over the course of the next ten years. The second-term administration may be caught very short indeed if de-democratization in Russia accelerates.

There is also an argument, not uncommon in Washington, that the issue that most concerns European elected officials is not territorial but *job* security, or to be more precise, the security of jobs in the European defense industry. European security specialist Mette Sangiovanni has argued forcefully that ESDP[†] is pointless, because lack of European political unity (not to mention the expected need for a United Nations mandate) would emasculate it in the face of any crisis. But the one value that even she finds in ESDP is that its success would "restructure the European defense industry in order to develop a stronger and more efficient high-tech industrial sector." It would "offer opportunities to rationalise defence spending and reduce procurement costs through cooperation on armaments production and undo the dramatically increased reliance on U.S. defense products."³⁴

FOR WHAT THREATS TO DOMESTIC SECURITY IS FEDERAL AUTHORITY RESPONSIBLE?

It is an exaggeration, but one useful for highlighting the discrepancy at hand, to say the main uncontested role of the U.S. national government is to provide territorial security, while the main uncontested role of most European national governments is to provide *economic* security. Obviously the two are interrelated,

^{*}That is, the jailing of its founder, then the seizure and forced sale to the government of its largest unit.

[†]European Security and Defense Policy, an EU initiative arising from the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty: "The central aim is to complete and thus strengthen the European Union's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention and crisis management." ("External Relations," *Europa*, europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/esdp/.)

but they remain distinct. The job of territorial security in Europe has de facto been "outsourced" to—depending on the circumstances—nascent EU security institutions, NATO, or coalitions of the willing. Even British military planning is now based on the assumption that any military conflict involving the United Kingdom would also involve the United States, and its leaders shape procurement accordingly.³⁵

To repeat the argument stated in brief at the outset, what a government perceives as a threat is determined by what it understands its areas of responsibility and its priorities—to be. For the U.S. federal government, maintaining territorial integrity is a much higher priority than, say, enabling its citizens to obtain a university-level education. It would be absurd to say that European national governments do not care about territorial integrity; obviously, they do. But other priorities accompany it near the top of their lists of concerns. Their understanding of what constitutes "homeland security"—a phrase not commonly used in Europe, as opposed to the United States—is much broader than the American view, as it includes a commitment to social welfare programs unmatched in the United States. European leaders, and particularly Germans, place a much higher priority on such challenges as European integration and management of their social market economies. Moreover, European voters and national governments alike worry, in a way that the United States does not understand, about the threat posed by America itself. The worry is not a straightforward notion that somehow the United States will become an enemy of Europe again. Rather, there exists concern both that American behavior will damage the efficacy of a rule-based international order and that its actions will create an enormous anti-Western backlash that could engulf Europe as well as the United States.

In short, because of profoundly varying understandings about both the nature and responsibilities of federal authority, Washington and European leaders are talking past each other. The answer to the question, "What threats to domestic security is federal authority responsible for?" is a very different one on opposite sides of the Atlantic. To answer this question, Europeans would first need to clarify what is meant by "federal" authority. Then they would produce a long list of duties. Hence, the individual national capitals have fewer resources to devote to each of the tasks, and the European Union security apparatus is still too new to compensate with economies of scale in the provision of security.

The American response would be a different and—as the historical analysis here has shown—internally contradictory one. The Bush administration, contrary to the sweeping proclamations made in the second inaugural speech on 20 January 2005, ultimately adheres to a narrow version of federal authority. For this reason the White House spent much of the day after the inaugural speech downplaying its significance, a curious follow-up to a major presidential address.³⁶

In summary, the U.S. position represents the awkward combination of two different historical legacies. The contradictions inherent in these legacies help to explain some of the paradoxes of first-term Bush administration foreign policy, and the same clash of legacies will continue to inform policy making in the second term. When the Bush team said "four more years" during the campaign, it meant just that. The second Bush administration is peopled largely by individuals who do not feel that they need to change their approach drastically. Hence contradictions from the first term will persist. The more that its European partners understand about this inherent contradiction, and the more that Americans understand about the very different European understanding of "homeland security," the better they will be able to deal with each other in the coming years.

NOTES

- 1. "Transatlantic Trends 2003," project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di San Paolo (Turin, Italy), p. 5. Available at the GMF website.
- Pew Research Center, poll of 7,500 respondents in nine countries, conducted February

 March 2004. Available on the Pew website.
- On the subject of views of America in Europe, see also the work of the British scholar Richard Crockatt, America Embattled: September 11, Anti-Americanism and the Global Order (London: Routledge, 2003).
- 4. No longer having a security clearance, I cannot address questions of classified threat assessment within the professional intelligence community. I served as a White House Fellow from 4 September 2001 until 2 September 2002 and held a security clearance in that capacity.
- 5. Eliot A. Cohen, "History and the Hyperpower," Foreign Affairs (July/August 2004). As he puts it on page 52, "The U.S. now accounts for between 40 and 50 percent of global defense spending, more than double the total spending of its European allies (whose budgets are so riddled with inefficiencies that, aside from territorial defense, peacekeeping, and some niche capabilities, the European pillar of NATO is militarily irrelevant)."

- Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 16–17.
- G. John Ikenberry, "Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004).
- 8. William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, *America's Inadvertent Empire* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2004), see pp. 92 and 161, and all of chaps. 3, 4, and 6.
- Paul Kennedy, "The Conundrum of American Power in Today's Fragmented World,"
 Lady Margaret Lecture, Christ's College,
 Cambridge, 20 November 2002, available
 with accompanying PowerPoint slides at
 www.yale.edu/iss.
- 10. Martin Enserink, "Reinventing Europe's Universities," *Science* 304 (14 May 2004), pp.951–52. Cambridge and Oxford were the only two non-American institutions in the top ten.
- 11. There are countless editions of the *Federalist Papers* available, but a recent one with a useful introduction is James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Penguin Books, 1987). They are also available at many websites, of which the Avalon Project of Yale University Law School is one of the better ones.
- 12. The NATO politician Zachary Selden summarizes this mood as follows: "The primary

- and perhaps exclusive task of the federal government is to protect its citizens from external threats." Selden is the director of the defense and security committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. See Zachary Selden, "Neoconservatives and the American Mainstream," *Policy Review*, no. 124 (April/May 2004).
- 13. James Thomson, "U.S. Interests and the Fate of the Alliance," *Survival* 45 (Winter 2003–2004), pp. 208–209.
- Roskin, Michael. "From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 89 (Autumn 1974), p. 563.
- Michael G. Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000), p. 6.
- 16. For a useful and succinct summary of Woodrow Wilson's life and work, see John A. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson (London: Pearson, 2002).
- 17. John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2004), p. 51.
- 18. Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "After the Long War," *Foreign Policy* 94 (Spring 1994), available online. As they put it, the Cold War "created a new model for relations between the state and society."
- 19. The declining interest in foreign news throughout the 1990s suggests that Deudney and Ikenberry were right (Garrick Utley, "The Shrinking of Foreign News," Foreign Affairs 76 [March/April 1997], available online). As Walter Russell Mead puts it, "In the view of the Red States, fascism and communism both originated in Europe and flourished worldwide because Europeans supported them—they died in large part because Americans fought them at great cost in treasure and blood. For the Red States, case closed." Walter Russell Mead, "Goodbye to Berlin?" National Interest 75 (Spring 2004), p. 21.
- 20. Walter Laqueur, *No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Continuum, 2003), see p. 129ff.
- 21. The American Political Science Association investigated requirements for earning a doctorate in 2003. A survey of nearly all top U.S.

- universities revealed that 84 percent required no foreign-language ability or accepted a knowledge of statistics instead, and 91 percent had no qualitative requirements whatsoever. In other words, political scientists earn their stripes without having to demonstrate any knowledge of the language or history of the regions in which they are expert. Andrew Bennett, Aaron Barth, and Kenneth R. Rutherford, "Do We Preach What We Practice? A Survey of Methods in Political Science Journals and Curricula," *Political Science and Politics* 36 (July 2003), pp. 373–78.
- 22. See Nicole Deller et al., Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding Security-Related Treaties (New York: Apex, 2003); and John F. Murphy, The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005).
- 23. Melvyn P. Leffler, "National Security," in *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, 2d ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), p. 135.
- 24. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, official government ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 399, available at a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/ 05aug20041050/www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/ fullreport.pdf.
- 25. Thomson, "U.S. Interests and the Fate of the Alliance," p. 207. He adds: "These differences stem from divergences in views of vital security interest, threats to those interests and the role of military force in security policy. These divergences had their beginnings on 9 November 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down, and became clearer after the terrorist attacks on 11 Sept. 2001."
- 26. Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence Now* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), pp. 282–83.
- 27. Henry A. Kissinger and Lawrence H. Summers, co-chairs; Charles A. Kupchan, project director, Renewing the Atlantic Partnership: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), p. 3.

- Robert Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004), available online.
- Katrin Bennhold, "Europe Takes New Alerts with Grain of Salt," New York Times, 6 August 2004, p. A9.
- 30. For a discussion of the way in which the failure to find weapons of mass destruction has aroused ire not only abroad but at home, see Richard K. Betts, "The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work This Time?" Foreign Affairs (May/June 2004), available online. For examples of skepticism published by U.S. presses, see Bruce Cumings et al., Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth about North Korea, Iran, and Syria (New York: New Press, 2004), and Benjamin Barber, Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy (London: Norton, 2003).
- 31. This is one of the conclusions of my *German Military Reform and European Security*, Adelphi Paper 340, (London: Oxford Univ. Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 2001).
- 32. Sergei Ivanov, "Russian-NATO: Strategic Partners in Response to Emergent Threats," speech to IISS, 13 July 2004. In the printed

- form of his remarks distributed by IISS, these comments appear on pp. 21–22.
- 33. Elisabeth Bumiller, "Bush Tells Veterans of Plan to Redeploy G.I.'s Worldwide," *New York Times*, 17 August 2004, p. A6. Since Bush made this announcement in the crucial swing state of Ohio during the hotly contested 2004 election year, clearly the administration was assuming this would be a popular move with voters.
- 34. Mette Eilstrup Sangiovanni, "Why a Common Security and Defence Policy is Bad for Europe," *Survival* 45 (Winter 2003–2004), p. 197. One example of EU protectionism is the Eurofighter, a project that survives even as the chances that the EU will ever need to use it for its designated mission—air-to-air combat—grow ever more remote.
- See, in *The Economist*, "Thinning the Ranks,"
 July 2004, and "Lions Equipped by Donkeys,"
 July 2004.
- 36. See, for example, "Bush Doctrine is Expected to Get Chilly Reception," *Washington Post*, 23 January 2005, which notes that after the speech "administration officials have since tried to tamp down expectations of a radical shift in policy."